Short answer: "Quantum secure" is too broad a promise. The practical task for Irish organisations today is a cryptographic migration: inventory where public-key cryptography is used, find long-lived sensitive data, and plan upgrades using NIST's post-quantum standards. This does not require a quantum computer, and it does not mean all encryption is broken today.

What is actually at risk

A large quantum computer is expected to break public-key cryptography such as RSA and elliptic curve methods, which protect key exchange and digital signatures. Symmetric encryption like AES is affected much less. No such machine exists today, but data recorded now could be read later, so long-lived data needs attention first.

What NIST has released

NIST approved its first post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment, FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) for signatures and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for hash-based signatures. NIST publishes its ongoing work on its post-quantum cryptography pages. These standards are what vendors are building to.

Three different things people mix up

  1. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC): new algorithms that run on ordinary computers and are designed to resist quantum attack. This is the main route for most organisations.
  2. Quantum key distribution (QKD): uses quantum physics to distribute keys over dedicated links. It has its own costs, distance limits and use cases.
  3. General cyber hygiene: patching, access control, backups and monitoring. Most real breaches still come from here.

Their costs, use cases and evidence differ, and a sound Irish security roadmap keeps them separate.

A practical roadmap

  • Now: build a cryptographic inventory and rank data by how long it must stay confidential.
  • Next: ask suppliers for post-quantum roadmaps, including hybrid modes.
  • Then: pilot ML-KEM in non-critical systems, and plan signature migration for long-lived keys.
  • Always: keep the basics strong.

Why it matters here

Irish banks, hospitals, law firms, data centres and public bodies hold data with long lives. Acting early is cheaper than a rushed change later.

Written from Clonmel, Tipperary for Quantum Ireland.

Questions to ask your suppliers

  • Which of your products use RSA or elliptic curve cryptography, and what is the plan to support ML-KEM and ML-DSA?
  • Is there a hybrid mode, and can we switch it on?
  • What is the performance and size impact on our systems?
  • How will certificates and code-signing keys be migrated?
  • What is the date for making post-quantum support the default?

Written answers are more useful than verbal assurances. They also give you evidence of due care if a customer or regulator asks.

FAQ

Is my data at risk from quantum computers today?

Not from a working quantum computer, because none can break current encryption yet. The risk is that data recorded now may still matter when one exists.

Do I need a quantum computer to become quantum-safe?

No. Post-quantum cryptography runs on ordinary computers.

What is the difference between PQC and QKD?

PQC is new software algorithms. QKD uses quantum physics over dedicated links. They serve different needs and have different costs.

Which standards should I look at first?

NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment and FIPS 204 and 205 for signatures.

Where do I start?

With an inventory of where public-key cryptography is used and how long the data it protects must stay secret.

All field notes